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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I use the framework developed by Julie Rose in Free Time to 
offer an initial analysis of another under-theorized resource that liberal 
egalitarian states might owe their citizens: that is, the sense of moral 
entitlement to make use of their basic liberties. First, I suggest that this 
sense of moral entitlement, like free time, might be necessary for the 
effective use of those basic liberties. Next, I suggest that this sense of moral 
entitlement (again, like free time) might be the kind of all-purpose good 
that satisfies publicity and feasibility criteria. Together, this suggests that a 
sense of moral entitlement to make use of basic liberties is the kind of 
resource that is appropriate for distribution by a liberal egalitarian state, 
and that such states indeed owe their citizens.
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In her excellent book Free Time, Julie Rose offers an extensive analysis of 
the under-theorized resource of free time. In it, she argues for two main 
conclusions: first, that free time has the requisite features to count as a 
distributable resource within a liberal egalitarian theory of justice; and 
second, that liberal egalitarian states have an obligation to fairly distribute 
free time to citizens, on the grounds that free time is necessary to guarantee 
the effective use of the other basic liberties. While Rose’s substantive 
discussion of free time is clearly her book’s most significant contribution 
to political philosophy, I focus here on another of its valuable features: the 
way in which her argument serves as both a model for exploring other 
under-theorized resources that liberal states owe their citizens, and a 
reminder of the importance of developing comprehensive accounts of 
these other resources. 
In this paper, I use Rose’s strategy, along with the structure of her 
argument and insights from her broader discussion, to run a parallel 
1 For helpful comments, I am grateful to Timothy Fowler, Jonathan Herington, Tom 
Parr, Chad Van Schoelandt, and the Editor and an anonymous referee for this journal. 
DOI: 10.31009/LEAP.2017.V5.08
92 Rosa Terlazzo 
LEAP 5 (2017)
argument that justice might also require the fair distribution among 
citizens of a sense of moral entitlement to make use of one’s basic liberties. 
In a paper of this length, however, I can only offer a rough and initial 
argument, noting only in passing where points are controversial or require 
further development. Like free time and justice, giving a full account of the 
relationship between justice and a sense of moral entitlement would 
require a book-length treatment. 
1. FREE TIME, A SENSE OF MORAL ENTITLEMENT, AND 
EFFECTIVE USE OF THE BASIC LIBERTIES
Like Rose I take it for granted that liberal egalitarians must be committed 
to ensuring the effective use of the freedoms and opportunities they 
distribute among citizens (2016: 69-73). While different liberal egalitarians 
may specify the principle differently, I will use the following general 
formulation:
Effective Freedoms Principle: The liberal egalitarian state has an  
obligation to ensure citizens the effective rather than merely formal 
use of some centrally important set of freedoms.
Use of this principle requires three clarifications. First, the distinction 
between effective and formal freedom. While formal freedom guarantees 
absence of certain kinds of interference in a given arena, effective 
freedom guarantees that one can in fact achieve the freedom’s object. 
That is, effective freedom requires access to whatever resources are 
needed to exercise it. So while a person has formal freedom of movement 
insofar as the law prevents others from physically restraining her, she 
does not have effective freedom of movement unless she has either the 
internal abilities or external assistive technologies to move herself from 
place to place. Second, note that the principle requires that liberal 
egalitarian states must guarantee their citizens freedoms only within 
some centrally important set, the members of which will depend upon 
the liberal egalitarianism in question. For instance, while a version of 
comprehensive liberalism might guarantee the effective use of a set of 
freedoms that it takes to be especially metaphysically valuable, a version 
of political liberalism might guarantee a set of freedoms centrally 
important to the roles of citizenship. Third and finally, notice that while 
liberal egalitarian states have this obligation to citizens, it may in some 
cases be defeasible. Cases of defeasibility will once again depend on the 
species of liberal egalitarianism concerned, but the following cases 
should be illustrative: effective freedoms may be inappropriate for some 
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citizens given their capacities (as with children and certain political 
freedoms); they may be forfeited (as with the criminal who gives up her 
right to freedom, or the spendthrift who wantonly and repeatedly 
squanders the resources necessary to exercise another freedom); or their 
provision may conflict with some other central commitment of the liberal 
egalitarian state (as in a case in which one citizen’s effective use of her 
religious freedom would require state provision of immense resources 
that would violate the state’s principle of just distribution.)
Given the Effective Freedoms Principle, Rose argues that the state 
owes citizens a certain quantity of free time. In Rose’s words, “An absence 
of free time constitutes a lack of means in the same way as a lack of income 
and wealth, and the lack of either renders one less able to take advantage 
of one’s formal liberties and opportunities” (2016: 73). Consider classically 
guaranteed liberal-egalitarian freedoms: freedom of association, 
freedom to vote, freedom to hold political office, etc. In order for these 
rights to be more than formal, one must have both money and time. To 
run for office, educate oneself about candidates’ platforms, or associate 
with one’s fellows, one must have time that is not consumed by finding 
the basic resources to care for one’s own or one’s dependents’ basic needs. 
So while the person washing dishes 100 hours per week just to make ends 
meet may have these formal liberties, he will be unable to exercise them 
in practice. Contrast this person with the highly-paid psychologist who 
could support herself by working 20 hours per week but chooses to work 
100 because she values great wealth. While her work also leaves little 
excess time for exercising her liberties, Rose argues that she has the 
effective option to exercise them in a way that her counterpart does not.2 
Accordingly, while citizens may choose not to use their free time to 
exercise their basic liberties, Rose argues that a government that 
guarantees the effective use of basic liberties must guarantee that 
citizens have sufficient free time to exercise them after meeting their 
basic needs.
Note that Rose’s project is to show that time – like money – is merely 
necessary for the effective use of one’s freedoms. But the following 
examples suggest that time and money together are not always sufficient 
to effectively guarantee persons the freedoms to which they are politically 
entitled. First, consider Irma, an affluent housewife who believes that a 
woman’s place is in the family. While she could easily afford childcare, a 
paid cleaning service, or private education, she believes that it would be 
morally wrong of her to allow her children or home to be cared for by 
others. Accordingly, she rarely associates with those outside of her family 
2 See the distinction between free and necessary time: Rose (2016: 40-43).
94 Rosa Terlazzo 
LEAP 5 (2017)
even when she might like to, does not engage in politics, etc. Second, 
consider Harvey, who is part of a reclusive religious community. While 
Harvey lives a comfortable life with much time for leisure, he believes 
that engaging with politics is sinful. There is an important sense, I argue, 
in which both Irma and Harvey lack effective freedom to exercise their 
basic liberties. While each is aware of their politically-guaranteed 
freedoms and has the time and monetary resources to exercise them, 
neither feels morally entitled to do so. 
The point is not merely that Irma and Harvey refrain from exercising 
their rights, since most of us refrain at many points from exercising them. 
The point is rather that both Harvey and Irma take there to be a categorical, 
substantive obstacle to their exercising some of their most basic 
politically-guaranteed rights. To be sure, the obstacle in question is 
internal – each recognizes that no external party or lack of resources 
prevents them from exercising those rights. But each, given their central 
commitments, also recognizes that exercising those rights is not an 
option that is substantively available to them. And note that we cannot 
say that the obstacle does not exist, simply because neither Irma nor 
Harvey has the aim of exercising those freedoms. An inaccessible building 
does not stop being effectively inaccessible to a person who uses a 
wheelchair simply because she does not want to enter it. Like the 
wheelchair user, Harvey and Irma do not just take themselves to be in a 
position where they do not choose to exercise their freedom. Rather, by 
their own lights, each cannot. The wheelchair user’s obstacle is the 
building’s lack of ramps. For Irma and Harvey, the obstacle is the belief 
and the concomitant feeling that they are not morally entitled to exercise 
those freedoms. While neither Irma nor Harvey may be bothered by this 
obstacle, given the desires they actually have, it remains the case that 
each one’s lack of a sense of their own moral entitlement to exercise their 
basic liberties remains a substantive obstacle to that exercise. 
My claim, then, is that an absence of this sense of moral entitlement, 
like an absence of free time, compromises the effective use of one’s basic 
freedoms. Given the Effective Freedoms Principle, this claim in turn 
suggests that liberal egalitarian states have an obligation to remove this 
obstacle. But here we must be careful. By virtue of their liberalism, liberal 
egalitarian states also have a commitment to some degree of neutrality 
between conceptions of the good. Different versions of liberalism will 
again conceive of this commitment to neutrality differently, but all 
should agree that within at least some range, the state should not favor 
some lives citizens might choose over others. Comprehensive liberals 
will likely draw this sphere of neutrality fairly narrowly, limiting it to 
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valuable, autonomously-chosen lives (i.e. Raz 1986). Political liberals, 
alternatively, will likely include any of those lives that recognize political 
values and respect the rights of all citizens (i.e. Rawls 1993). But note that 
as described Irma and Harvey’s commitments could both fit at least into 
the political liberal’s sphere of neutrality, and might even fit into the 
comprehensive liberal’s. So if my claim about a sense of moral entitlement 
and effective freedom is correct, we are left here with a conflict between 
the Effective Freedoms Principle and a liberal commitment to neutrality.
Given the length and focus of this paper, I cannot attempt to fully 
adjudicate this conflict. Indeed, there is a history of serious objections to 
the removal of internal obstacles to freedom that dates back at least to 
Isaiah Berlin (1969). But remember, my aim here is modest: I simply aim 
to use Rose’s framework to give an initial account of whether some other 
good – that is, a sense of moral entitlement – might, like free time, both 
prove necessary to guarantee effective freedom of basic liberties, and 
meet the criteria for being a resource distributable by a liberal egalitarian 
state. Whether or not – and indeed how – this obstacle ought to be 
removed, I hope to have at least motivated the idea that it constitutes a 
real obstacle to the effective use of one’s basic liberties. Accordingly, I 
will turn shortly to the criteria for resources appropriate for distribution 
by a liberal egalitarian state.
Nevertheless, while I cannot fully adjudicate the conflict here, let me 
at least briefly suggest how a liberal aiming to balance effective freedom 
and neutrality might move forward. Imagine that Irma and Harvey 
developed their comprehensive doctrines quite differently: while Irma 
adopted hers as an adult after a period in which she felt morally entitled 
to exercise her basic liberties, Harvey adopted his without having 
considered or been exposed to alternatives, as a result of growing up in a 
relatively homogenous community. One plausible method for balancing 
commitments to effective freedoms and neutrality is to treat these cases 
very differently. While Irma experienced a period in which she took there 
to be no obstacle to the exercise of her basic liberties, Harvey never 
experienced a similar period of effective freedom. Furthermore, even if 
Irma currently views her moral commitments as closed to revision, the 
fact that they have already undergone a significant change means that 
she has a first-hand understanding of the way in which commitments 
might change with time and new experience. So even if Irma and Harvey’s 
comprehensive doctrines both compromise their effective freedom to 
exercise basic liberties in the moment, Irma’s one-time possession of a 
sense of moral entitlement to exercise them leaves her better-placed to 
experience effective freedom again in the future. While fostering an early 
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sense of moral entitlement does not then guarantee effective freedom to 
exercise basic liberties throughout the course of a lifetime, it both allows 
citizens to adopt a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines in adulthood, 
and makes more provisional the internal obstacles to effective freedom 
that those doctrines might include. 
2. A SENSE OF MORAL ENTITLEMENT AS A RESOURCE
As I said, Rose’s strategy in Free Time is to show that free time is both 
necessary for the effective use of persons’ basic liberties, and meets the 
criteria for being a resource that a liberal egalitarian government can 
distribute among its citizens. If a sense of moral entitlement, like time, is 
necessary for the effective use of one’s basic liberties, then we should now 
turn to the question of whether it meets the criteria for counting as a 
resource in a liberal egalitarian state. 
Before we do so, however, we should further specify what we mean by a 
sense of moral entitlement. While the examples of Irma and Harvey 
motivated the idea that a lack of a sense of moral entitlement can 
compromise the effective use of one’s basic liberties, there are two distinct 
but related senses of entitlement that could do so. While I won’t take a 
stand here on which is better suited to serve as a resource distributed by a 
liberal egalitarian state, distinguishing between the two will clarify the 
discussion that follows. First, one could believe that they are directly 
morally entitled to exercise their basic liberties.3 If persons take themselves 
to be entitled in this way, and also have sufficient time and monetary 
resources, then they plausibly have effective use of their formally-
guaranteed liberties. But second, one could believe that one is morally 
entitled to change her conception of the good if appropriate reasons 
present themselves. Imagine that Harvey never took himself to be directly 
morally entitled to the exercise of his political liberties – but that, at some 
relevant point in his development, he did take himself to be morally entitled 
to adopt other conceptions of the good, including those according to which 
he would be morally entitled to make use of his political liberties. Although 
Harvey never felt morally entitled to use the particular goods to which he 
was politically entitled, he was open to considering reasons to do otherwise, 
3 Note that many liberals will hold that the value of basic liberties derives at least in 
part from the role they play in allowing citizens to live the lives that they themselves take to 
be valuable. Insofar as other goods (like wealth, income, education, healthcare, etc.) that a 
liberal state is obligated to fairly distribute to citizens derive their value from the same 
source, we may want to expand our sense of moral entitlement to include moral entitlement 
to make use of these other goods as well. However, this further point cannot be addressed 
here.
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and to changing his view if those reasons proved compelling. While it can 
be difficult to determine when a person is genuinely open to considering 
reasons that conflict with their conception of the good, when that bar has 
been met they plausibly have effective use of their formally-guaranteed 
basic liberties – as least as long as they also maintain the time and the 
money to make use of them. 
Now let’s turn to Rose’s framework for determining whether a good 
counts as a resource to which the citizens of a liberal egalitarian state have 
a claim. In order for citizens to have such a claim, it must first be the case 
that it is appropriate for a liberal egalitarian state to distribute the good in 
question, given liberal egalitarianism’s distinctive commitments. It must 
second be the case that the good in question can be effectively and justly 
allocated, given the nature of the good. 
2.1 Is a sense of moral entitlement an all-purpose good?
I accept Rose’s standard formulation of liberal egalitarianism’s two 
distinctive commitments: the liberal commitment to individual freedom 
of choice, and the egalitarian commitment to ensuring some degree of 
equality in the distribution of society’s benefits (2016: 23). But these 
principles stand in some tension, since individuals freely choosing life 
paths will likely end up with shares of goods that are different in both size 
and kind. For instance, if my idea of a good life involves world travel while 
my neighbor’s involves investment in real estate, we will likely end up with 
very different shares of exciting stories and vacation properties. 
Accordingly, I also accept along with Rose the standard liberal egalitarian 
position that states should be concerned with the distribution of all-
purpose goods that individuals can use to advance their conceptions of the 
good, rather than the specific goods that their conceptions of the good 
direct them to attain. In her words, “specific goods are the particular goods 
that one requires to pursue one’s particular conception of the good, 
whereas resources are all-purpose means that one generally requires to 
pursue one’s conception of the good, whatever it may be” (2016: 27, original 
emphasis). A yacht, then, counts as a specific good that might feature 
prominently in some good lives but have no place in others, while wealth 
and income count as all-purpose goods because they can equally be used 
to acquire yachts, leisure time, the ability to support beloved charities, or 
the specific goods that have a central place in other lives. If the state 
distributes resources which anyone can use to advance their own idea of a 
good life, then each citizen can see how her interests are served by that 
distribution – while if it distributes specific goods valued by only some 
individuals, then those who do not value those goods have cause for complaint. 
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So the first test for a sense of moral entitlement is to determine whether 
it is an all-purpose good. On the face of it, it does not seem to be. At least, it 
is clearly not required to pursue all conceptions of the good, no matter 
what those conceptions may be. Given that both Harvey and Irma have 
conceptions of the good that can be pursued without exercising at least 
some of their basic liberties, they also have conceptions of the good that 
can be effectively pursued without a sense that one is morally entitled to 
directly pursue those liberties. And while some persons may take the 
ability to change one’s conception of the good to be central to any 
substantively good life, many more will not – and this large remainder can 
therefore effectively pursue their conceptions of the good without a sense 
that they are morally entitled to change them. 
But we should not be too quick to judge from this that a sense of moral 
entitlement is not an all-purpose good. Even wealth and income are not 
required to pursue literally any conception of the good, whatever that 
conception may be. Consider the person who takes the good life to be a life 
of prayer in which one has no possessions and eats only what they are 
freely given by others.4 Since wealth, income, and the basic liberties 
themselves are the canonical all-purpose goods, we therefore need a 
different account of what it means to be an all-purpose good. While I don’t 
aim here to defend one account as correct, each of the following three 
possibilities is both a plausible account of all-purpose goods, and plausibly 
counts a sense of moral entitlement as an all-purpose good. 
First, a good might be all-purpose if it is useful for advancing a broad 
range of conceptions of the good. This is plausibly what is suggested by 
Rose’s specification that all-purpose goods are those means that are 
“generally” required to pursue conceptions of the good, whatever they may 
be. While there may be a few exceptions, advancement of almost all 
conceptions of the good will benefit from these means. And although it 
may be possible to advance the majority of conceptions of the good without 
a sense that one is morally entitled to change that conception of the good, 
it is much harder to identify conceptions of the good that can be effectively 
advanced without a sense that one is morally entitled to take advantage of 
one’s basic liberties. And this is because the value of a basic liberty for a 
conception of the good is generally understood to be instrumental. For 
many of us, political participation or free speech is not an intrinsically 
valuable part of a good life. Instead, both allow us to express what we take 
to be good, or to defend our way of life when it is under attack. But liberties 
cannot benefit our conceptions of the good in this way unless we exercise 
4 For further argument that primary goods are not plausibly means that one wants 
whatever else they want, see Nelson (2008).
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them – and one is much less likely to actually exercise a liberty that one 
does not take oneself to be morally entitled to exercise. So since basic 
liberties will themselves be instrumentally valuable for advancing a broad 
range of conceptions of the good, the sense of moral entitlement to exercise 
them will be as well. 
Second, a good might count as all-purpose if it is required for developing 
or protecting the moral powers and interests associated with citizenship. 
This suggestion aligns with John Rawls’s proposal that what is taken to be 
valuable for citizens relates to the higher-order interests they are taken to 
have as citizens – including, famously, the capacity for a sense of justice 
and the capacity to hold and revise a conception of the good.5 If we take 
these to be the relevant interests of citizens, then citizens obviously have 
an interest in a sense of moral entitlement to change their conception of 
the good. The ability to do so is central to the second moral power, and it 
once again frustrates both a capacity and its development when a person 
feels unentitled to exercise and thereby strengthen that capacity. Similarly, 
a sense of moral entitlement to directly exercise one’s basic liberties 
plausibly supports the second moral power, because the exercise of those 
liberties themselves supports that power by allowing citizens to try out 
and investigate new ways of life that might lead them to adopt new 
conceptions of the good.
Third, a good might count as all-purpose if it is closely tied to some 
other value that grounds liberalism’s commitments to equality and 
neutrality. Take, for instance, Alan Patten’s claim that the value of both 
equality and neutrality depend on the more fundamental liberal value of 
self-determination (2012). If self-determination is at bottom what matters 
for liberal states, then other resources should be distributed to the extent 
that they further that value. And a sense of moral entitlement to change 
one’s conception of the good certainly does so. If one feels perpetually 
bound to one’s conception of the good even when compelling reasons to 
modify it arise, then one plausibly becomes a prisoner to that conception 
of the good rather than a self-determining individual. Similarly, the basic 
liberties generally distributed by liberal states very plausibly provide 
persons with essential freedoms and means to live their lives as they see fit 
– but they once again do so instrumentally, and their instrumental benefit 
again generally only accrues if one feels entitled to make use of them when 
the need for them arises.
5 See also Gina Schouten’s (2017) argument that protection of the two moral powers 
often in fact demands substantive progressive interventions on the part of liberal egalitarian 
states – up to and including preserving a live option for all citizens to engage in gender-
egalitarian division of household labor.
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While this discussion by no means exhausts the ways in which we could 
understand all-purpose goods, each is plausible – and each gives us a 
plausible reason to think that the sense of moral entitlement with which 
we are concerned is the kind of thing that ought to count as an all-purpose 
good.
2.2 Can entitlement be effectively and justly allocated?
In order to count as a resource using Rose’s criteria, an all-purpose good 
must also be the kind of thing that satisfies the following publicity and 
feasibility criteria (2016: 46): 
Publicity Criterion: It must be possible for an outside party to reliably 
and verifiably know whether and to what extent an individual 
possesses a given resource.
Feasibility Criterion: It must be possible for the outside party to 
obtain relevant knowledge and distribute the good non-invasively 
and efficiently.
The publicity criterion applies because in order for justice to be done, 
citizens must be able to see that it has been done. If a resource is not the 
kind of thing that can reliably be measured, then citizens cannot know 
whether a just distribution has been achieved. And the feasibility criterion 
applies because efficiency and privacy matter alongside publicity. If 
enormous resources must be expended to monitor or fairly distribute a 
good, or if that monitoring and distribution comes at the cost of citizens’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy, then these considerations count heavily 
against treating that good as a resource that a just state ought to distribute. 
To illustrate, consider health. While health is required to pursue almost 
any conception of the good, it is not always possible to adequately judge 
relative shares of health. This is so both because different definitions of 
health better capture the health level of different individuals, and because 
health is not a free-floating concept that makes sense without reference to 
the state of a population. Further, in order to monitor and influence the 
distribution of health among citizens even according to some stipulated 
definition, the state would need to engage in frequent and highly intrusive 
testing and treatment of individuals. Health, then, will not count as a 
resource on Rose’s criteria. But note that a nearby good – that is, healthcare 
– can still count. Since healthcare is required to protect health when it 
fails, and since failing health threatens the ability to pursue almost any 
conception of the good, healthcare is what Samuel Arnold calls a 
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“second-order all-purpose [good]” (2012: 97).6 A second-order all-purpose 
good is one that is “instrumental to the possession of entities or attributes 
that are themselves all-purpose [goods]”. And the second-order all-
purpose good of healthcare satisfies publicity and feasibility criteria. 
Regarding publicity, it is possible to know both what coverage citizens have 
for which medical conditions, and whether citizens live within appropriate 
proximity to medical establishments. And regarding feasibility, that 
information can be collected and the good can be provided both non-
invasively and efficiently. By providing universal healthcare or enforcing 
an individual mandate, states can both ensure the provision of care and 
non-invasively and efficiently gather information about what coverage 
individuals have; and by determining a citizen’s address and whether 
relevant public transportation is available, states can non-invasively and 
efficiently gather information about whether citizens can effectively seek 
treatment.7 
We must determine, then, whether a sense of entitlement satisfies the 
publicity and feasibility criteria. First, consider publicity. It is highly likely 
that there is no fully verifiable and reliable way for third parties even in 
theory to accurately determine and compare persons’ comparative shares 
of a sense of moral entitlement. Citizens may understand their degrees of 
entitlement very differently, and even when they report the same rating, 
the scales that they use may be incommensurable. And turning to 
feasibility, even if these obstacles could be overcome, making such 
comparisons in practice would require extensive and invasive questioning 
of persons, as well as time- and resource-intensive calculations to 
determine citizens’ relative scores.
Two different responses might be made by proponents of treating a 
sense of moral entitlement as a resource. The first is to identify a second-
order all-purpose good associated with the sense of moral entitlement. 
This approach follows Rawls’ precedent of including “the social bases of 
self-respect” rather than self-respect itself in his list of primary goods 
(1999). If a particular set of social conditions roots and reliably fosters the 
relevant sense of moral entitlement, and that set of social conditions passes 
the publicity and feasibility conditions, then we could count that set of 
social conditions as our resource. While it is in large part an empirical 
matter whether some set of conditions roots and reliably fosters a sense of 
moral entitlement, it seems prima facie likely that the conjunction of some 
6 While Arnold calls such goods all-purpose “resources” I call them goods and – 
with Rose – reserve the term resource for goods that meet all of our criteria.
7 To be sure, there are many important social determinants of health, of which 
healthcare is only one. I leave open the question of whether these other determinants satisfy 
the publicity and feasibility criteria.
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standard of formal education and broad exposure to persons living diverse 
lives would do so. The more that one enjoys close connections with those 
living diverse lives, and comes to appreciate their reasons for holding 
different conceptions of the good, the more likely they will be to see as 
morally legitimate the choice to hold another conception of the good or to 
make use of the resources and liberties used by one’s peers. And a third 
party can certainly verifiably and reliably determine whether citizens are 
enrolled in these kinds of education and live in diverse communities. 
Gathering this information should also be relatively efficient and non-
invasive, since it will primarily require consulting census data and 
curricular data that are already collected. And states clearly have at their 
disposal resources for effectively determining curricular standards and 
encouraging diverse neighborhoods.  
The other response is to reject the move to second-order all-purpose 
goods on the grounds of the type of resource that a sense of moral 
entitlement is. Here Rose’s treatment of free time is once again illuminating. 
As Rose argues, the appropriate distributive principle may vary from 
resource to resource, depending on each resource’s nature (2016: 85ff). 
Take Rose’s comparison of inequalities in time and material wealth. 
Inequalities in either domain can be problematic from the point of view of 
justice, because either can lead to social inequalities between citizens. But 
there are two reasons to think that inequalities in wealth are more 
worrisome than inequalities in free time. First, there is a natural limit to 
inequalities in free time that does not hold in the case of wealth (2016: 87). 
While the potential difference between the wealthiest and poorest subject 
is virtually limitless, inequalities between the most time-rich and time-
poor citizens can vary by at most a few hours in a given day. After all, some 
kinds of self-maintenance simply cannot be outsourced.8 So to the extent 
that equality of resource directly translates into social inequality, 
inequalities of time simply allow for a lower degree of inequality. Second, 
material wealth can be more efficiently converted into other kinds of basic 
goods than can time (2016: 88). For instance, a person with a comparatively 
large share of free time can use that time to undertake additional paid 
work or petition her lawmakers, thereby gaining additional income or 
political influence. But she must do so in real time, and cannot readily 
trade her free time with others who will advance these ends for her. 
However, a person with a comparatively large share of wealth can readily 
trade that wealth for a great variety of other goods: for the consumer goods 
that signal social class, for the elite education that cements one’s children’s 
8 While these differences could compound over a lifetime, the degree of inequality 
possible for time could never approach the degree of inequality possible for wealth.
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high social position, or for the political influence that lobbyists and large 
campaign contributions can buy. Both of these differences suggest that a 
sufficiency principle might effectively protect social equality in the case of 
time but not wealth. While either can be used to attain a set of additional 
goods that negatively impact social equality, time is converted into these 
additional goods much less efficiently, and the limits on the time that one 
can have to convert are furthermore much stricter. 
With regards to distributive principles, a sense of moral entitlement to 
use one’s basic liberties seems to be more like free time than like money. 
While persons might have stronger and weaker senses of moral entitlement, 
our focus here is on the effect of a sense of moral entitlement on the 
effective use of one’s basic liberties. And this effect is plausibly binary: one 
may exercise one’s basic liberties hesitantly or enthusiastically, but what 
matters for advancing one’s plan of life is that one does in fact exercise 
them when the situation calls for it. Beyond the threshold that allows one 
to exercise one’s basic liberties, having a stronger sense of moral entitlement 
to do so does not seem to make a person substantially better able to exercise 
them than her fellow citizens. What does this mean for the appropriate 
distributive principle for our sense of moral entitlement? Remember that 
sufficiency was meant to be a more plausible distributive principle for time 
than for money on the grounds that unchecked inequalities in money 
allow greater corresponding inequalities between citizens. If one does not 
become substantially better able to exercise her basic liberties the more 
morally entitled she feels to do so, then sufficiency is also a plausible 
distributive principle for our sense of moral entitlement. 
Determining whether this seemingly plausible claim holds would 
require space for further defense. But if it held, then a focus on sufficiency 
should make both the publicity and the feasibility criteria easier to 
satisfy. First, consider publicity. Unlike determining comparative shares, 
determining sufficiency would no longer imply comparing persons' 
relative levels of the sense of moral entitlement, or the conceptual and 
practical problems that come with it. Instead, it would simply require 
determining whether each person takes herself to be able to choose to 
exercise her basic liberties if reasons to do so arise – and this can be 
determined through simple self-reporting. And if we diffuse the tension 
between the Effective Freedoms Principle and a commitment to liberal 
neutrality in the way suggested above, then a concern with sufficiency 
would also make the feasibility criterion easier to satisfy. If we aimed to 
ensure only a sufficient sense of moral entitlement during early life, then 
the relatively undemanding self-reporting required to determine 
sufficiency could be built into public education at regular intervals without 
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great cost. And if we were concerned with a threshold level of a sense of 
entitlement rather than a comparative level, then public education could 
aim to bring all students past the line without worrying that some will 
progress significantly further than others. 
3. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, the argument offered here is initial and cursory, and 
many objections and important subtleties have by necessity been passed 
over.9 But I hope that the discussion so far has served my modest aim: to 
begin to show us how we might extend Rose’s helpful framework to offer a 
treatment of other under-explored or under-theorized resources that a 
liberal egalitarian state owes its citizens. I hope that it has also encouraged 
readers to believe that a sense of moral entitlement to exercise one’s basic 
liberties is one such resource worth exploring – and if so, then I hope that 
Rose’s framework can serve to illuminate a longer (perhaps also book-
length) treatment of that resource in the future. 
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